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FOILED BY THE BANKS?
HOW A LENDER’S DECISION





A United Nations Environmental Programme report addressing climate
change states that the built environment in both emerging and developed coun-
tries accounts for more than forty percent of global energy usage and at least one
third of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. The report further asserts that the
built environment offers an unsurpassed opportunity to supply cost effective, last-
ing, and meaningful reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. In response to this
call to action, state and local governments in the U.S. have turned to a variety of
policies to ensure that real estate developments within their jurisdictions further
green building objectives. However, the availability of mortgage financing for the
construction or acquisition of green buildings can undermine policymakers’ over-
arching environmental objectives. Lenders who misunderstand the unique risks
and opportunities associated with green buildings may undercut these important
environmental policies by denying real estate financing for worthy construction
projects or acquisitions. Accordingly, this Article builds upon my previous work
that addressed some of the financial aspects relating to green buildings such as
performance bonds, insurance, and construction loans while now turning to the
unique issues associated with mortgages and provides solutions that can mitigate
risk exposure to acceptable levels so the lending community can further a more
ecologically-friendly built environment.
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INTRODUCTION
Across the country, policymakers at all levels of government are work-
ing to address climate change issues that emanate from the continued re-
lease of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.1 In considering the various
sources and their respective contributions, a United Nations study explained
that the built environment accounts for forty percent of the global energy
usage and at least one third of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.2 Given
1. See generally Darren A. Prum, Robert J. Aalberts & Stephen Del Percio, In Third
Parties We Trust? The Growing Antitrust Impact of Third-Party Green Building Certification Sys-
tems for State and Local Governments, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 191, 204–19 (2012).
2. U.N. Env’t Programme [UNEP], Buildings and Climate Change: Summary for Deci-
sion-Makers, U.N. Doc. DTI/1240/PA, at 9 (2009).
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this opportunity for significant emissions reductions, many policymakers
have turned to the built environment as a key component in their strategies
to address climate change within their jurisdictions.3
In focusing on private sector buildings, policymakers have an opportu-
nity to deliver cost-effective, lasting, and meaningful reductions in green-
house gas emissions.4 Most of these buildings programs offer something of
value to developers in exchange for specified design changes or existing
building upgrades.5 These initiatives can occur at the state or local level,
and they may take the form of financial or nonfinancial incentives.6 In
many situations, the incentive programs have become highly successful in
encouraging developers to build an environmentally-friendly structure.7
While many policymakers have found these types of initiatives an effec-
tive tool to encourage the construction of environmentally friendly build-
ings, the underlying policy goals may be undermined if the ultimate owner
of the structure cannot get a mortgage to complete the purchase. In some
situations, the developer is the ultimate owner of a building and must secure
permanent financing prior to receiving approval for a construction loan;8
while at other times, the mortgage will fund the purchase of an existing
structure.9 In both of these circumstances, the ultimate owner of the build-
ing will frequently need the assistance of the lending community to provide
a long-term and permanent mortgage for the bulk of the real property’s
value to move forward with the structure’s acquisition.10
3. See CHARLES K. KIBERT, SUSTAINABLE CONSTRUCTION: GREEN BUILDING DESIGN AND DE-
LIVERY 47–49 (2d ed. 2007). For example, the “Greening of the White House” efforts that
began in 1993 showed dramatic energy cost savings of approximately $300,000 per year,
reductions in emissions of approximately 767 metric tons of carbon per year, and substantial
decreases in the related costs for water and solid waste. Id. at 48. These achievements paved
the way for new efforts in other parts of the executive branch of the government like the
U.S. Post Office, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the General
Services Administration. Id. at 49.
4. See Prum, Aalberts & Del Percio, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Darren A. Prum, Creating State Incentives for Commercial Green Buildings: Did the
Nevada Experience Set an Example or Alter the Approach of Other Jurisdictions?, 34 WM . & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 188–99 (2009) [hereinafter Prum, State Incentives]. In New York,
just seven projects exhausted the entire incentive pool, compared to the program passed by
the Nevada Legislature, which was too generous and caused the state to revise and limit the
benefits associated with compliance at its next scheduled meeting. Id. at 192.
8. See Paul V. Franke, A Primer on Construction, Permanent, and Bridge Lending in Fi-
nancing the Affordable Housing Deal, 7 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 279, 284 (1998).
9. See PETER S. BRITELL, GREEN BUILDINGS: LAW, CONTRACT AND REGULATION § 8.01 (1st ed.
2010).
10. See generally TERRENCE M. CLAURETIE & G. STACY SIRMANS, REAL ESTATE FINANCE: THE-
ORY & PRACTICE 415 (Cengage Learning 6th ed. 2010).
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In building upon my previous work that tackled some of the financial
aspects relating to green buildings such as performance bonds,11 insurance,12
and construction loans,13 this Article seeks to address the adjustments nec-
essary in the underwriting process and accompanying documents to prop-
erly manage and mitigate the risk exposure and support climate change
action within the built environment. Part I examines the inherent risks that
confront lenders when extending permanent loans on any type of building
regardless of its green features. These risks may emanate out of various title
theories applied across the country, federal environmental regulations, re-
strictive covenants and equitable servitudes, and issues stemming from the
manner in which the borrower acquires the building. It also considers how
lenders attempt to mitigate risks through underwriting measures that care-
fully consider the suitability of the borrower and the property offered as
collateral.
Part II turns to the unique attributes and risks green buildings pose to
lenders of permanent financing. Some of these risks occur uniformly, no
matter the method used to obtain the structure, while other risks originate
from the acquisition method. These common risks often stem from a lack of
knowledge about green buildings and translate into misguided estimates and
prognostications in the financial models developed by underwriters to assess
risk premiums for loans, the ability of a borrower to adequately insure the
collateralized property, and the various green attributes incorporated into
the structure. In situations where a development project triggers permanent
financing, government requirements and third-party certification issues
may create risk.
Finally, Part III offers solutions that can mitigate the unique risks
green buildings pose to permanent lenders. The subparts provide recom-
mendations specific to the underwriting process and to permanent loan doc-
uments. The proposals for the underwriting process offer suggestions to
assist lenders in capturing pertinent information at the time of the applica-
tion and evaluating the financial models and pro-forma statements when
making the loan decision. Similarly, the recommendations for loan docu-
11. Darren A. Prum & Lorilee A. Medders, The Bonds That Tie: Will a Performance
Bond Require that a Surety Deliver a Certified Green Building?, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 (2012).
12. Darren A. Prum, The Next Green Issue: Considering Property Insurance for the Green
Building, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 421 (2013) [hereinafter Prum, Next Green Issue].
13. Darren A. Prum, Greenbacks for Building Green: Does a Lender for Sustainable Con-
struction Projects Need to Make Adjustments to Its Current Practices?, 43 ENVTL. L. 415 (2013)
[hereinafter Prum, Greenbacks]. This Article seeks to expand upon the issues initially ad-
dressed with construction loans in Greenbacks for Building Green by turning to the unique
concerns that emanate out of permanent financing instruments on both newly constructed
and existing structures.
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ments take aim at preconditions and conditions subsequent that can miti-
gate the unique exposures of the green building.
I. MORTGAGE RISKS
Lenders consider many factors when evaluating a potential loan to en-
sure timely repayment and avoid losses.14 Some of these factors include the
priority over other creditors, the presence of hazardous substances requiring
remediation, and whether the loan supplies funding for a development pro-
ject or an existing structure. Most lenders attempt to limit their exposure to
such risks through an underwriting process that carefully considers the suit-
ability of the borrower and the property offered as collateral.
Accordingly, this Part examines the risks inherent to all mortgage fi-
nance and how the underwriting process screens applicants for such risks.
Through this careful examination of the proposed collateralized property
and applicant, the underwriters will determine the creditworthiness of an
application along with a corresponding risk for funding the loan. This risk
assessment and possible remediation solutions, such as higher interest rates
or more stringent covenants, will give critical input to lenders as to whether
funding the loan is appropriate. On a more macro level, it will determine
the availability of funding for all buildings, including those considered
green.
A. Loss Exposures/Encumbrances
Across the country, state governments establish and maintain the sys-
tems that preserve the official records of land ownership. These property
records systems serve as important documentation for the courts when rec-
ognizing and enforcing rights and encumbrances on real property.15 When
resolving these types of real property disputes, many courts must follow the
legally recognized recording system of a given jurisdiction to establish the
priority order for an encumbrance on a specific parcel of land.16 Because
courts follow local recording systems when determining priority positions,
the same factual scenario may lead to different results for priority order
based on the recording system involved.17 For example, a party with a claim
14. See DAVID M. GELTNER ET AL., COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE ANALYSIS AND INVESTMENTS
442–43 (OnCourse Learning 3d ed. 2014).
15. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.9, at 823 (2d ed. 1993).
16. Id. § 11.9, at 825–26.
17. Ray E. Sweat, Race, Race-Notice and Notice Statutes: The American Recording System,
3 PROB. & PROP. 27, 28 (1989). Approximately half of all jurisdictions follow a “notice”
approach where a bona fide purchaser for value receives protection regardless of the record-
ing of the encumbrance. Id. This makes the recording of an encumbrance irrelevant, so long
as the parties exchanged something of value. Id. Nearly all of the remaining states use a
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against a given parcel of land could risk the diminishment of its rights
should it fail to properly record the encumbrance in a timely manner.18
Thus, lenders that wish to secure their loans using real property as collateral
must understand a jurisdiction’s approach and recognize the potential for
numerous encumbrances upon the land before entering into a transaction.
1. Theories of Title
The titling and ownership of real property, along with the ability to
encumber it, differs across the country. The main approaches in use today
include the “title” and “lien” theories of mortgage law and an intermediate
method.19 In jurisdictions following English common law under a Title
Theory, the lender holds the legal “title” to the real property until the debt
is satisfied or foreclosed, but does not receive possession.20 In contrast, in
lien theory states, the lender retains a security interest in the real property
and receives the right to possess it after a valid foreclosure occurs, resulting
in the owner of the land maintaining the title.21 In addition, a few states
attempted to find middle ground through an intermediate theory, which
gives the lender possession when a default occurs but leaves the title on the
real property with the owner.22
With these different methods in place, the lender’s and property
owner’s status on the title and standing for obtaining a security interest in
the real estate becomes an issue. In those jurisdictions that follow a title
theory, the lender will automatically obtain legal “title,” along with a secur-
ity interest, at the time of the conveyance.23 This approach makes it diffi-
cult for a lender to lose its priority status in foreclosing on the property if
the owner fails to repay the loan.
In comparison, the owner retains the “title” to the real property with
the lender’s interest becoming that of a lienholder in the lien and intermedi-
ate theory jurisdictions.24 Consequently, a sloppy lender could unintention-
ally surrender its priority position and potentially suffer a loss if another
“race-notice” system that includes a bona fide purchaser and recording requirement. Id. This
means that the first to record and receive value for the encumbrance will receive priority
over all others claiming an encumbrance. Id. Finally, some states award priority based on the
order in which the encumbrances record and are called pure “race” jurisdictions. Id.
18. Id.
19. 1 GRANT NELSON & DALE WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.5, at 12 (6th ed.
2014).
20. Id. § 4.1, at 201. Currently, a minority of states follow this approach. Id.
21. See id. § 4.2, at 202–03. Currently, thirty-two states follow this approach. Id. § 4.2,
at 202 n.1.
22. Id. § 4.3, at 208.
23. See id. § 4.1, at 199–201.
24. See id. §§ 4.2–4.3, at 202–03, 208–10.
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encumbrance exists against the real property and then gains superior
rights.25
For these reasons, many of the participants in the real estate commu-
nity and lenders recognize these risks and require a proper recording of the
appropriate documents without delay.26 Nonetheless, a lender may also face
the prospect of losing its priority position in those jurisdictions that draw
distinctions between obligatory and optional advances.27 When the cove-
nants of the loan agreement provide for the disbursement of funds at a later
date, an obligatory advance occurs; but if the lender uses its own discretion,
the situation becomes an optional advance.28 In some jurisdictions that set
the priority date based on the disbursement of funds, a subordination of the
mortgage to other lien claims will occur because the loan agreement does
not compel the optional advance.29
Hence, careless mortgage lenders may have their security interest sub-
ordinated to other encumbrances in situations where the lending agreement
fails to compel any applicable subsequent disbursements in a lien theory
jurisdiction.
2. Environmental Issues
Improper disposal of hazardous waste on a property can pose serious
risks to lenders. This is especially true when the government places a lien
on the property effectively subordinating a mortgage or deed of trust, or
when subsequent litigation occurs and a court attaches liability to the lender
as a responsible party. Accordingly, prudent lenders must properly assess
these risks.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA) imposes strict joint and several liability for hazardous
waste cleanup costs on “Potentially Responsible Parties” (PRPs), including
owners, past owners, and operators of facilities.30 The “security interest ex-
25. See 3 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON CON-
STRUCTION LAW § 8:146, at 334–39 (2002).
26. See generally CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 15.
27. See 3 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 25, § 8:146, at 337.
28. Id.
29. Id. One of the earliest cases to set a preferential order of repayment between two
different loans secured by a parcel of real property was Gordon v. Graham, where the initial
lender made subsequent discretionary advances after a second mortgage occurred. (1714) 22
Eng. Rep. 502 (Ch), overruled by Hopkinson v. Rolt, (1861) 11 Eng. Rep. 829 (HL). The
Gordon court decided the case based on its belief that “it was the Folly of the second Mortga-
gee, with Notice, to take such Security.” Id.
30. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-2\MEA203.txt unknown Seq: 8 18-MAY-16 12:43
442 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 5:2
emption” provides a safe harbor for most securitized lenders.31 This exemp-
tion prevents the government from holding a lender as a responsible party
that merely retains a mortgage or lien on a property.32 However, should a
lender foreclose on a contaminated parcel of real estate or become too in-
volved in the operation of the property owner’s business through its influ-
ence or through an outright takeover, the lender may void the exemption.33
Thus, a lender faced with a troubled loan from an existing borrower must
conduct a thorough analysis on its environmental risks, focusing on how to
recover its investment and whether it should foreclose and sell the collater-
alized property or accept a loss by relinquishing its security interest rights
against the land.
Besides facing potential liability for cleanup costs, a lender may unwit-
tingly lose priority on its security interest to a CERCLA lien that attaches
to property where the U.S. government has incurred cleanup costs. The
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) autho-
rizes the federal government to place a lien on real property of a PRP.34
Under the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization
Acts in 2002 (Brownfields Act), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) received expanded powers to use the “windfall lien” provisions in
situations where a bona fide prospective purchaser35 takes title to property
that received the benefit of public cleanup funds.36 The EPA calculates the
(2013)); ROBERT J. AALBERTS & GEORGE J SIEDEL, REAL ESTATE LAW 603 (Cengage Learning 7th
ed. 2009).
31. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 2502(b), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-464 (1996).
32. See CLAURETIE & SIRMANS, supra note 10, at 485.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(a)(iii). Several statutory defenses become available in those
situations where a lender gets drawn into a claim that originates out of foreclosure or by
significantly influencing the business operations. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). These defenses in-
clude assertions that the lender does not fit within the meaning of a “responsible party”; that
the contamination occurred solely due to an act of God, an act of war, or the act or omission
of a third party having no relationship with the lender; and that the innocent purchaser or
landowner defense applies. Id.
34. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No.
99-499, § 107(f), 100 Stat. 1613, 1630 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)).
35. As an incentive to spur the redevelopment of brownfields, Congress provided a
CERCLA defense to those landowners that knowingly acquire or lease contaminated prop-
erty after January 11, 2002. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40).  Those asserting the bona fide pro-
spective purchaser defense must prove by the preponderance of the evidence that they satisfy
the conditions set forth in the statute. Id.
36. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Acts in 2002, Pub.
L. 107-118, § 102(a), 115 Stat 2356 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r)(2)). Pursu-
ant to the applicable “windfall lien” statutes, the EPA must prove that: (1) the government
carried out a response action, (2) the government failed to recoup its costs to respond, and
(3) the cleanup activity increased the fair market value of the property over a prior assess-
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lien amount by considering the difference in fair market value attributable
to the remediation efforts and includes costs from the moment the agency
spends money on the cleanup until the disposition of the property or when
another source pays for the response costs.37
Remarkably, the EPA may incur costs associated with remediation and
clean-up efforts at one point in time but may elect to perfect and record the
lien at a later date.38 This unique provision in the law allows for a “secret
lien” to occur due to the fact that the statutes stipulate that the lien “will
arise” at the moment when the EPA incurs expenses to remediate the
pollution.39
Because neither the SARA legislation nor the Brownfields Act ad-
dresses the issue on the level of priority for this type of lien with respect to
other encumbrances, several state and local governments passed statutes and
ordinances to provide some level of direction.40 In these jurisdictions, a
state’s hazardous waste lien can subordinate other deeds, mortgages, and
ment based on its condition at the time. Id. § 9607(r)(3). Given the expansive authority
conveyed by these provisions, the EPA provided initial guidance through several policy state-
ments that clarified the process and requirements for giving notice, filing, and perfecting this
type of lien. Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Adm’r, Office of Enf’t &
Compliance Monitoring, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, on Guidance on Federal Superfund
Liens to Reg’l Adm’rs, Regions I–X, Reg’l Counsels, Regions I–X, Dirs., Waste Mgmt. Div.,
Regions I–X (Sept. 22, 1987), http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/guidance-federal-superfund-
liens-supplemental-guidance; Memorandum from William A. White, Enf’t Counsel, Office
of Enf’t/Superfund, and Bruce M. Diamond, Dir., Office of Waste Programs Enf’t on Sup-
plemental Guidance on Federal Superfund Liens to Reg’l Counsels, Regions I–X,  Dirs.,
Waste Mgmt. Divs., Regions I–X (July 29, 1993), http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/gui-
dance-federal-superfund-liens-supplemental-guidance.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r)(4).
38. See Memorandum from Susan E. Bromm, Office of Site Remediation Enf’t, U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency & Bruce S. Gelber, Envtl. Enf’t Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice on In-
terim Enforcement Discretion Policy Concerning “Windfall Liens” Under Section 107(r) of
CERCLA to Dir., Office of Site Remediation and Restoration, Region I et al. (July 16,
2003) [hereinafter Interim Windfall Lien Policy], http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/interim-
guidance-enforcement-discretion-concerning-windfall-liens-cercla-section-107r; Memoran-
dum from Susan E. Bromm, Office of Site Remediation Enforcement, U.S. EPA on Wind-
fall Lien Admin. Procedures to Superfund Division Directors, Regions I–X, Regional
Counsel, Regions I–X (Jan. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Windfall Lien Admin. Procedures], http://
www.epa.gov/enforcement/guidance-windfall-lien-administrative-procedures-107r-lien-and-
model-letter-providing.
39. See Interim Windfall Lien Policy, supra note 38; Windfall Lien Admin. Procedures,
supra note 38.
40. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-452a (2013); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-31-1(e), (f)
(2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 1371 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13 (2014);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b (West Supp. 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11f(f)
(West Supp. 2015), 58:10B-25.2 (West 2006). Some counties also maintain these types of
provisions. See, e.g., MIAMI DADE COUNTY, FLA., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ORDINANCES § 24-
31(8).
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encumbrances.41 However, the federal statute still requires perfection of the
windfall lien and only allows for priority status once recorded.42
While the full force of the statutes convey unique powers to the EPA,
the agency also recognizes that this authority may create consternation and
reluctance on the part of lenders to accept this type of risk or even limit
participation in brownfield redevelopment altogether. As a result, the EPA
also developed a policy to address potential issues raised by interested par-
ties.43 At the request of an interested party, the EPA may issue a letter that
explains the agency’s intentions with regard to pursuing a windfall lien on a
particular piece of real property.44
Consequently, a lender must evaluate each building and the associated
real property for any loss exposure it may have from an environmental per-
spective before providing its permanent financing. Some of these environ-
mental assessments must occur prior to funding the loan, while others must
occur on an ongoing basis to avoid later litigation. Therefore, environmental
issues pose significant risks to lenders, who must develop a plan to mini-
mize these risks in real property transactions.
3. Nongovernmental Issues
In addition to traditional sources of loss, a lender may face issues from
nongovernmental parties through restrictive covenants placed on the land
by prior owners or contractual relationships.45 The strength of these private
regulations on the attached structure can influence the value or legal status
of the mortgaged property and pose risk to any lending activity that uses
real property as collateral.46
a. Land Use Restrictions
Following common law principles, a property owner may exercise dif-
ferent legal approaches to privately compel and regulate land use.47 The
traditional methods for commercial structures include real covenants and
41. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 40.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)(3). This provision guarantees the recordation of the lien by
stating, “If the State has not by law designated one office for the receipt of such notices of
liens, the notice shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the United States district court for
the district in which the real property is located.” Id.
43. See Interim Windfall Lien Policy, supra note 38; Windfall Lien Admin. Procedures,
supra note 38.
44. Id.
45. See BRITELL, supra note 9. R
46. Id.
47. See Donald J. Kochan, A Framework for Understanding Property Regulation and Land
Use Control from a Dynamic Perspective, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 303, 303 (2015).
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equitable servitudes that run with the land. A more modern approach en-
tails creation of architectural review boards (ARBs), which must interpret a
set of covenants, conditions, and regulations (CC&Rs) that attach to the
deeds of trust.48
Real covenants offer mutually enforceable promises that limit the use of
land for specific purposes in a manner that binds every successive grantee.49
Real covenants run with the land, which means that the real property and
terms of the agreement must transfer together when conveyed to a subse-
quent grantee.50 While traditional common law maintains a bias towards
narrowly construing covenants that impose restrictions upon the use and
enjoyment of the burdened land, today’s reality reveals a more liberal ap-
proach.51 Often, the goal of the covenant is to achieve a greater good and
create a benefit for the land, which allows for the selective application of the
traditional approach.52 Accordingly, the vast majority of courts now liber-
ally construe uniform real covenants that apply to nearly all of the lots in a
subdivision that also create both a burden and benefit.53
Using a parallel approach to achieve comparable outcomes, equitable
servitudes call upon historically equitable principles to create benefits and
burdens that run with the land and bind successive owners, so long as they
receive notification of the original arrangement.54 As this approach has
48. See id. at 328. Of course, other methods exist such as Defeasible Fees and Negative
Easements. Defeasible fees are present estates that maintain the capacity to last in perpetuity
like a fee simple absolute. However, these are outside the scope of this Article.
49. See Covenant Running with the Land, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (10th ed. 2014).
50. Id. There are five requirements for a real covenant to run with the land, as Judge
Charles E. Clark explains:
(1) the form of the covenants;
(2) whether the covenanting parties intended the covenant to run;
(3) whether the covenant touches and concerns;
(4) whether there is privity between one or both of the covenanting parties and
the remote parties or parties sought to be benefited or burdened (“vertical priv-
ity”); and
(5) whether there is privity between the original covenanting parties (called “hori-
zontal privity”).
See CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH “RUN WITH THE LAND” 94
(2d ed. 1947); see also CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 15, §§ 8.13–8.18, at 466–80.
51. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 15, § 8.13, at 467.
52. Id.
53. Id. Roger Cunningham explains that many homebuyers place a premium on homes
where a tight system of real covenants protects a community’s value over those without such
burdens. Id. By extension, this same logic extends to master planned developments or indus-
trial parks where the construction of commercial green buildings occurs frequently.
54. Id. § 8.22, at 485. For an equitable servitude to run with the land, Professor Cun-
ningham explains, there are six requirements:
(1) form of the covenant;
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evolved to become the primary choice for developers that subdivide larger
parcels of land, the relaxed requirements of the equitable theories have al-
lowed for more liberal interpretations. Sometimes these expansive ap-
proaches occur when interpreting the essential requirements for an
equitable servitude. For instance, the “existence of a general development
plan to determine whether the successors were intended to benefit from
servitudes, and have inferred lack of intent where no general plan exists”
can determine whether intent exists.55 Other times, the courts chose to ex-
tend the equitable theories into real covenants, apply a contractual approach
to create third-party beneficiaries, or even eschew the philosophies from
either common law or equity.56
(2) intent of the covenanting parties that the covenant shall run;
(3) the requirement of touch and concern;
(4) (horizontal) privity between the covenanting parties;
(5) benefit or burden to successors of the covenanting parties; and
(6) notice.
Id. § 8.22, at 486. The theoretical distinction between a real covenant and an equitable servi-
tude has to do with the placement of the burden. See id. § 8.22, at 485. Under a real cove-
nant, the burden is placed upon the estate that holds the land, which carries forward with
each conveyance. See id. In contrast, an equitable servitude places a burden directly upon the
land just like an easement, which leads to the saying “the servitude ‘sinks its tentacles into
the soil.’ ” Id. Hence, the party entitled to enforce a real covenant tends to seek damages
whereas the beneficiary of an equitable servitude tends to favor an injunction against future
breaches along with any damages for earlier infringements. Id. §§ 8.21, 8.31, at 483–84,
495–96.
55. Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1279 (1982).
56. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 15, §§ 8.32–8.33, at 501–04. In extending the
equitable theories, some courts allow “implied reciprocal servitudes” when a developer cre-
ates multiple lots and then sells some or all of the parcels to buyers who are both benefited
and burdened by the uniform covenants and receive them both explicitly and impliedly. Id.
§ 8.32, at 496–501. Under this approach, courts generally start by establishing a real cove-
nant but then mix and blend equitable theories pertaining to easements into their reasoning
to create a cocktail of precedent for upholding the developer’s uniform covenants. Id. § 8.32,
at 501.
In applying a third-party beneficiary theory, those courts take the approach that the
rights to enforcement originated in contract rather than the more accepted interests in land
and apply to all parcels regardless of whether their deed actually contained the restrictions in
question. Id.; see also Robert Kratovil, The Declarations of Restrictions, Easements, Liens, and
Covenants: An Overview of an Important Document, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 69, 70–71 (1988).
These courts look toward the existence of a common plan for development, that some deeds
within the covered land include the restriction in question, and that some of the landowners
actually follow the covenants on the ground. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 15, § 8.32, at 502.
Finally, Professor Cunningham categorizes “Second-Generation” cases as those from a
series of decisions that uphold the running of covenants upon the land without relying upon
any legal theory to uphold them. Id. § 8.33, at 503. The first group of these types of cases
makes a conclusory statement regarding the existence of a common plan of development and
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Finally, the use of ARBs offers another method for a master planner or
developer to privately regulate a parcel. In these situations, when conveying
the land, the master planner or developer creates a common interest devel-
opment (CID) by creating separate property ownerships, coupled with an
interest in the common area or association of the entire parcel.57 The devel-
oper drafts the CC&Rs, which are mutually binding and enforceable agree-
ments against all owners within the CID.58 However, the enforcement,
maintenance, and interpretation of the CC&Rs is delegated to the CID’s
association or its designee, like an ARB.59 Pursuant to the applicable
CC&Rs, the CID’s association or ARB then possesses the authority to ap-
prove and enforce all construction plans according to the master planner or
developer’s design as well as any subsequent changes to the structures
within the development.60 Because the CC&Rs run with the land, along
with burdening and benefiting current and future property owners, the
CID’s association maintains the ability to legally enforce its decisions
through the courts.61
Thus, lenders must conduct their own research as to whether the real
property and building proposed as collateral for the loan includes any un-
derlying or problematic land use restrictions for the mortgagor. These re-
strictions may occur on a general level but may also include some very
specific standards for the type and level of green building measures re-
quired. There may also be operational requirements for occupants, which
can negatively affect a property’s value or the ability of a mortgagor to keep
covenants by the grantors and grantees and then holds for their enforcement. Id. The second
group allows for the enforcement on behalf of the fellow lot owners by a third-party benefici-
ary or trustee such as a homeowner’s association that may own its own land instead of attrib-
uting its authority to the vindication of its own rights. Id. § 8.33, at 503–04. The last group
removes the notice requirement of the restrictions by treating the covenants like easements.
Id. § 8.33, at 504.
57. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 6580 (West Supp. 2016). In some jurisdictions, such as
California, the government imposes additional requirements that must be recorded, for ex-
ample a declaration and parcel map. Id. The association generally owns and manages the
common areas including the parking lots, non-dedicated streets, and various amenities. All
landowners become members of the association once they receive title to their properties,
must pay fees for the upkeep of the common areas, and must abide by the rules for maintain-
ing the desired environment declared in the CC&Rs that are attached to the deeds.
58. See, e.g., id. § 6614.
59. See, e.g., id. § 6858.
60. See generally, Daniel K. Slone, Legal Aspects of Eco-Industrial Development, in ECO-
INDUSTRIAL STRATEGIES: UNLEASHING SYNERGY BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT 139–40 (Edward Cohen-Rosenthal & Judy Musnikow eds., 2003). Architectural
design, building height, outdoor storage limitations, maintenance of common areas, and use
limits are examples of the various types of rules set forth by CC&Rs in CIDs. Id. at 143–44.
61. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 6614, 6858 (West Supp. 2016).
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its business open and make payments.62 Accordingly, lenders must complete
their due diligence with regard to land use restrictions, or risk an unfore-
seen loss.
b. Leasehold Estates
Another instance of private regulation potentially leading to unforeseen
loss is a mortgage upon a leasehold estate.63 In these situations, the lender
funds a loan for a building where the mortgagor does not own the land on
which the structure is located but uses the structure as collateral for the
loan.64 These transactions pose distinct risks that may come from a variety
of sources, such as the violation of a covenant in an underlying leasing
agreement, the foreclosure of an underlying mortgage on the real property,
or the classification of the improvements upon the land by the tenant and
landlord.
62. See Slone, supra note 60, at 143. Mr. Slone points out that some industrial CIDs
include adherence to some type of green building standard such as the United States Green
Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) program as
part of their CC&Rs to construct or make improvements upon the land located within it. Id.
In other industrial CIDs, the CC&Rs incorporate other environmental or social sus-
tainability standards within the business’ operations to qualify for occupancy and to remain
there. Id.
63. While this type of situation might seem unlikely, it actually occurs more frequently
than expected. Participants in franchising ventures often fit into this situation because they
lack the financial capacity to construct and own their facility outright. There are also typi-
cally requirements from the franchisor that each location under its master agreement portray
a common look and feel in addition to meeting specific building requirements. See JEFFRY A.
TIMMONS & STEPHEN SPINELLI, JR., NEW VENTURE CREATION: ENTREPRENEURSHIP FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 227 (McGraw-Hill/Irwin 6th ed. 2004). Harry Sonnenborn developed this model
for McDonald’s in 1956 where a franchisee would pay McDonald’s the greater of a minimum
rate associated with leasing the property or a percentage of its sales. DANIEL GROSS, FORBES
GREATEST BUSINESS STORIES OF ALL TIME 185 (1997). This strategy allowed McDonald’s to in-
clude its policies as part of the rental agreement, which made them enforceable using real
property law doctrines in addition to those in contracts. See id. at 185–86.
64. A leasehold estate allows for a tenant’s possession of land or premises. See CUN-
NINGHAM ET AL., supra note 15, § 6.11, at 260. This may occur as a tenancy for years, periodic
tenancy, tenancy at will, or as a tenancy at sufferance. See id. §§ 6.13–6.20, at 261–73.
In a tenancy for years situation, the lessee receives possession and control of the land by
the owner for a fixed or finite period of time in advance. See id. § 6.14, at 264. This means
that the lessee holds an interest in real property and the owner retains only a reversionary
interest in the land, which only vests when the lease ends. See id. § 6.12, at 260–61.
In contrast, a rental contract confers upon one party the right to use and enjoy a speci-
fied piece of property in a manner that does not damage or diminish it. See id. § 6.2, at
250–51. This usufruct concept closely mirrors that of license and does not create a real
property. Id. Hence, the holder of a leasehold estate may mortgage his interest because a
property right exists, whereas a party to a rental contract cannot.
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When considering the risk posed by a landlord terminating a leasehold
tenancy with a tenant, the common law begins with a premise that prevents
either party from ending a leasehold interest due to the other’s breach un-
less the lease specifically authorizes it or a violation of the law occurs.65
This means that the leasehold estate may only terminate when one of the
parties specifically violates one of the covenants within the lease that allows
for ending the leasehold estate.66 Furthermore, the lease will not terminate
until the party with the power elects to exercise it in some unequivocal
manner.67
Of course, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel may impose a limitation
on a party’s ability to terminate a lease.68 Under the doctrine of waiver, one
party can voluntarily relinquish the legal right to terminate the lease either
explicitly or impliedly.69 This waiver only shields against past breaches and
subsequent reoccurrences of the same infringement.70 Nonetheless, some
courts hold that a party may trigger this limitation when choosing not to
pursue the termination remedy as well.71 When applying estoppel, a non-
breaching party may not exercise its powers to terminate the lease in situa-
tions where it stood by or assisted the breaching party in its infringing
actions.72 The courts will consider the non-breaching party to have sanc-
tioned the violation by virtue of its actions.73 By extension of these limita-
tions, a parallel defense may spring from a contractual discharge like
“frustration of purpose,” which provides for excusable nonperformance.74 In
considering this option as a means for termination, scholars explain, “be-
cause there has been frustration on an object of the agreement that certainly
was fundamental to the tenant, and even to both parties, the law excuses the
tenant’s whole performance.”75
65. See id. § 6.78, at 398–400. Taking this premise to its most fundamental application,
the only exception may occur when a landlord breaches his duties under the warranty of
habitability. Id. With respect to the law, a common situation occurs whereby the lease autho-
rizes termination if one of the parties becomes insolvent or declares bankruptcy—but this
violates the applicable code section and is unenforceable. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (2006).
66. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 15, § 6.78, at 398–400.
67. Id.
68. See 10 MEMBERS OF THE FIRM OF MILLER STARR REGALIA, MILLER & STARR CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE § 34:223 (4th ed. 2015) [hereinafter MILLER & STARR].
69. 49 AM . JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 260 (2015).
70. Id.
71. MILLER & STARR, supra note 68.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 15, § 6.87, at 412–13.
75. Id. § 6.87, at 413.
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The second source of risk stems from the underlying mortgage on the
land itself. Typically called a fee mortgage, these types of encumbrances
may occur prior to or after the execution of the leasehold mortgage. Should
a fee mortgage already exist, the lender may be precluded from proceeding
unless a subordination occurs.76 Depending on the jurisdiction’s laws for
terminating subordinate interests upon foreclosure, a number of policies
and regulatory rules will preclude the leasehold mortgage due to the high
risk of loss caused by its junior status.77 However, that does not stop a
lender from seeking an agreement with the current fee mortgagee to surren-
der its priority position to the leasehold mortgage.78
In contrast, a fee mortgage that takes place after the existence of a
leasehold mortgage will not gain priority unless the ground lease is
amended or the leasehold mortgagee or a purchaser at foreclosure begins a
new lease.79 This priority situation occurs because the only title the prop-
erty’s owner can pledge to the lender is the reversionary interest, which is
already subordinate to the lease.80 Nevertheless, a fee mortgage recorded
after the execution of the ground lease but before putting into place an
amendment or new lease could result in a subordination situation.81
Finally, the manner in which the landlord and tenant classify the im-
provements upon the land may create a situation of loss for the lender.
Courts generally recognize that the lender of a leasehold mortgage keeps a
security interest for the loan in the possessory estate, along with any im-
provements made upon the real property.82 This applies notwithstanding
the manner in which the tenant acquired its rights, including those situa-
tions such as a new lease or a sale and leaseback arrangement with the
underlying real property.83 In spite of the long-standing precedent recog-
nizing the security interest in improvements under real property law, one
outlying decision by an Arizona appellate court centered its opinion on Ar-
ticle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which gave superior rights to a
lender that foreclosed upon a ground lessee’s building and fixtures placed
upon the land over real property owner. However, this opinion was subse-
76. 1 MICHAEL T. MADISON ET AL., LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 7:12 (2015).
77. See generally id. § 3:12.
78. See generally id. § 7:4. While this may sound unlikely, a fee mortgagee may consider
taking this action when a leaseholder seeks a construction loan that will have the effect of
increasing the total value of the collateralized property.
79. Id. § 7:12.
80. See generally CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 15, § 3.3, at 89–90.
81. See MADISON ET AL., supra note 76.
82. Id. § 7:1.
83. Id.
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quently ordered depublished by the Arizona Supreme Court, effectively dis-
qualifying it for use as precedent.84
Hence, the leasehold estate situation poses some very real and difficult
loss scenarios for a lender. Sometimes, these risks may come as a surprise,
such as the decision by a court to apply the Uniform Commercial Code in
lieu of the tried and true property law. Nonetheless, a savvy lender must
weigh these possibilities and carefully craft a plan to handle unexpected
losses.
4. Acquisition Attributes
In conjunction with the loss exposures posed by the subordination of
title, environmental cleanup, and nongovernmental sources, a lender must
also recognize the risks presented by providing the permanent financing for
a new development or for the purchase of an existing building.85 While both
situations ultimately end with the lender funding a long-term loan that en-
ables the borrower to purchase a building, each poses very different issues
that require consideration.
a. Development Projects
In the new development context, the mortgage lender usually gets in-
volved with the project at an early stage because the construction loan will
demand a “take-out” commitment as part of its short term financing re-
quirements.86 This precondition by the construction lender seeks to facili-
tate a smooth assignment and sale of the note at the appropriate time, while
making it difficult for any of the parties to materially change any of the loan
conditions during the many phases of the project.87 The executed tri-party
agreement between the borrower and the two lenders usually provides for
the purchase and sale of the promissory note used to finance the construc-
tion of the building upon completion and in compliance with the approved
84. See Fla. Receivables Trust 2002-A v. Ariz. Mills, LLC, 111 P.3d 430, 432–33 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2005), depublished by 127 P.3d 59 (Ariz. 2006).
85. See BRITELL, supra note 9, § 8.02. R
86. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 19, § 12.3; Colin C. Livingston, Current Business
Approaches – Commercial Construction Lending, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 791, 794 (1978).
87. See Livingston, supra note 86, at 800–01.
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plans and specifications.88 The agreement also compels the use of a single
set of documents for the transaction.89
In essence, the tri-party agreement attempts, in advance, to deliver the
types of documentation and other conditions the permanent financer will
require when called to perform to avoid a second underwriting process
when the building is completed.90 This proactive approach allows the bor-
rower and construction lender to obtain approvals from the permanent fi-
nancer during all phases of the project, and encourages the parties to resolve
any issues before they become contentious.91 As such, the permanent lender
must address the risks inherent in a construction project when it negotiates
the tri-party agreement.
To this end, the permanent lender must ensure that the completed
building will comply with all local ordinances and zoning requirements, re-
ceive a permanent certificate of occupancy from the appropriate authorities,
and qualify for property tax abatements. This is in addition to any other
governmental or private financial benefits considered applicable in the orig-
inal underwriting process prior to paying off the construction loan.92
Should the completed building fail to meet local ordinances or zoning re-
quirements, or receive its permanent certificate of occupancy, then the
structure may not be occupied at all,93 which could cause a default on the
permanent loan or mortgage. Similarly, but not as harmful, the inability to
qualify for property tax abatements or other financial incentives may se-
verely hamper the borrower’s ability to repay the loan or diminish the un-
derlying value of the collateralized building.94
88. See Franke, supra note 8, at 284–85. This distinctive requirement forces a borrower
to meet all conditions for the permanent financing before receiving the approval and the
closing of the construction loan. Id. As a result of this agreement, the underwriting process
for the construction loan will separate any issues that develop by determining whether they
relate to construction and completion, or if they concern the documentation requirements for
the permanent lender. See Livingston, supra note 86, at 797.
89. See id. at 800.
90. Id. at 797.
91. See Franke, supra note 8, at 284–85.
92. See BRITELL, supra note 9, § 8.02. R
93. Id.
94. Id. The inability to claim tax credits under Maryland’s green building incentive
program became the basis of Shaw Developers v. S. Builders, No. 19-C-07-011405 (Somerset
Cty. Cir. Ct. Md. 2007), which was the first case of its kind to confront this type of issue
with regard to an environmentally friendly structure. See Darren A. Prum & Stephen Del
Percio, Green Building Claims: What Theories Will a Plaintiff Pursue, Who Has Exposure, and a
Proposal for Risk Mitigation, 37 REAL ESTATE L.J. 243, 244 (2009). While the case settled out of
court, it demonstrates that the inability to deliver tax abatements or other financial incen-
tives can motivate parties to litigate due to their significance to a transaction and risks to the
lender. Id. at 261.
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In response to any of these shortcomings, a lender may receive through
the executed tri-party agreement the right to remedy any deficiencies in the
collateralized property.95 Nevertheless, a lender may avoid this type of ap-
proach unless it lacks another way to resolve the deficiency. This option
may expose a lender to additional liabilities from a sympathetic court that
finds its actions constituted participation in the construction project.96
Hence, a lender choosing to supply permanent financing for a building
under construction must take a proactive approach to limit its potential risk
of loss before accepting the terms of the tri-party agreement that require it
to fund a shaky mortgage that may never get repaid.
b. Existing Buildings
While not as risky as development projects, funding mortgages on ex-
isting buildings also presents loss exposure issues. In these situations, many
of the requirements that emanate out of the construction process, such as
the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, should already be satisfied.97
Moreover, the issues relating to property tax abatements or other financial
incentives should already be resolved and pose minimal risk.98
However, a risk averse lender may decide to further reduce any expo-
sure through the imposition of preconditions on the borrower during the
underwriting process.99 A lender may require the applicant borrower to
provide documentation that the property meets all local ordinance and zon-
ing requirements, that the appropriate authorities issued a certificate of oc-
cupancy for the building, and of the receipt of all tax abatements or other
financial incentives for the structure.100 With these assurances in hand, a
lender can confirm that little to no risk exists from these
95. See BRITELL, supra note 9, § 8.02. R
96. See Prum, Greenbacks, supra note 13, at 432–33 (2013). Typically, the courts ex-
tended liability to the lender in those cases where the claims originated out of a construction
defect. Id. The cases tended to focus on three issues: whether (1) the lender entangled itself
too much with the development, e.g., Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 447 P.2d 609
(Cal. 1968); Cent. Bank v. Baldwin, 583 P.2d 1087 (Nev. 1978); (2) the lender failed to
fulfill its obligations, e.g., Rudolph v. First S. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 414 So. 2d 64 (Ala. 1982),
Davis v. Nev. Nat’l Bank, 737 P.2d 503 (Nev. 1987), Daniels v. Army Nat’l Bank, 822 P.2d
39 (Kan. 1991), Lomax v. Hadley Homes, No. 02A01-9607-CH-00163, 1997 WL 269432
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); or (3) the lender turned into a responsible party upon its decision to
seize control and finish the project, e.g., Port Sewall Harbor & Tennis Club Owner’s Ass’n v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 463 So. 2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Chotka v. Fidelco
Growth Inv’rs, 383 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Dunson v. Stockton, Whatley,
Davin, & Co., 346 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
97. See BRITELL, supra note 9, § 8.02. R
98. Id.
99. See infra Subsection III.B.1.
100. See BRITELL, supra note 9, § 8.02. R
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-2\MEA203.txt unknown Seq: 20 18-MAY-16 12:43
454 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 5:2
sources.101Consequently, an existing building poses few risks to a lender
because the borrower may provide documentation for many of the
unknowns, such as the certificate of occupancy, and any other benefits like
tax abatements or other financial incentives. Therefore, a lender faces a
minefield of risk exposures, such as the loss of priority over other
lienholders, governmental liability for environmental cleanup costs, and
diminution in value of the collateralized property through nongovernmental
sources or through the underlying method by which the borrower acquired
the building.
B. Underwriting as a Risk Management Tool
Given that one in six long-term commercial mortgages in the United
States defaulted during the last quarter of the twentieth century, the under-
writing process now plays a critical role in preventing and minimizing de-
faults.102 Underwriters focus on the risk associated with a particular
borrower and proposed collateral property.103 Depending on the risk, a
lender may add extra requirements to the loan documents, such as the right
to conduct an audit, to minimize a perceived risk, and to memorialize each
party’s responsibilities.104
1. Borrower
Distinctly different from the standard residential mortgage, most loans
for commercial properties are nonrecourse or permit the lender to recover
very little from the borrower other than the collateralized property.105
While this may seem risky, a lender for commercial real property cannot
ignore these types of borrowers because they are typically wealthy individu-
als, businesses, or institutions that routinely participate in these types of
transactions.106 As such, a lender risks future business opportunities with
the borrower if she declines to participate in a transaction and the project
ultimately becomes a success.107
Conversely, lenders must also weigh the prospects that some borrowers
who maintain multiple business lines may divert funds or attention from an
101. Id.
102. See GELTNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 442. Beyond serving as a tool for minimizing or
eliminating defaults, underwriting also helps ensure that the lender receives the proper re-
ward for the amount of risk undertaken with the loan. Id.
103. Id. at 443.
104. See infra Section III.B.
105. See GELTNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 443.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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otherwise healthy collateral property to assist troubled endeavors.108 This
could lead to a borrower filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and a
forced renegotiation of the lending terms.109 Hence, the unique circum-
stances surrounding commercial real estate loans creates a business climate
whereby the lender must give special consideration to the reputation and
future business prospects of the borrower, while balancing the risks for a
given loan.110
2. Property
Although the borrower and the client-lender relationship influence the
loan determination, the lender will primarily rely on the internal underwrit-
ing analysis of the collateralized property to predict the borrower’s ability to
pay the debt.111 This analysis generally concentrates on the appraised asset
value and income flow of the subject property, as well as several other
metrics.112
In the asset value analysis, the lender’s underwriters will calculate the
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio because it provides a single indicator that takes
into account an asset’s value, along with its income coverage.113 Because the
lending community maintains models that link the LTV ratio to default
probabilities and predict a borrower’s ability to repay the loan, this ratio
becomes a crucial factor in determining whether to provide funding.114 At
first, the underwriters will use the LTV at the time the loan commences to
consider the most stringent situation.115 However, many underwriters will
also evaluate the LTV over the loan’s duration by using projected net oper-
ating income on the property and direct capitalization.116
When evaluating the income flow for the property, the underwriters






113. Id. at 444.
114. Id. When linking the LTV ratio to a model that corresponds with default
probability, a nonlinear relationship appears. Id. It shows a low probability of default and is
virtually constant in an extensive range of low values of the LTV, but the risk rises quickly at
the higher ratios. Id.
115. Id. at 445.
116. Id. When making this calculation, the underwriters must pay attention to the LTV
when the loan matures because sometimes the financing agreement will not call for full
amortization. Id. In these cases, the lender must make sure that the property’s value greatly
surpasses the outstanding loan balance at maturity. Id.
117. Id.
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calculation, the underwriters will compare the collateral property’s annual
net operating income to the annual debt service required by the loan. Typi-
cally, the underwriters will want to minimize the likelihood that the bor-
rower will find itself pressed for cash flow, so the ratio must usually meet or
exceed 1.2.118 Nevertheless, a lender may adjust this hurdle depending on
their current risk sentiment, as well as allowing for lower ratios in the be-
ginning years, so long as a solid projection occurs during the remaining
years of the loan.119
Supplementing these two indicators, underwriters sometimes turn to
calculating the Break-Even Ratio (BER), the Equity-Before-Tax Cash Flow
(EBTCF), and the loan yield as other methods to predict the borrower’s
ability to repay the debt.120 The underwriters use the BER as a proxy to
determine the occupancy ratio of the building, while they employ the
EBTCF to get a feel for the borrower’s ability to overcome any needed
capital improvement expenditures.121 Most recently, underwriters began to
look at the loan yield to determine a recoverable rate of return that shows
the lender what it must see in the case that a foreclosure becomes necessary,
and the lender has to rely on the property’s net operating income as part of
its calculated value in a liquidation sale.122
Accordingly, the lender’s underwriters will follow a process that em-
ploys a broad set of indicators coupled with conservative yet flexible stan-
dards to adapt to current market conditions, while screening for situations
that indicate the likelihood a borrower will fail to repay the loan.
II. LENDER EXPOSURE TO RISKS INHERENT TO A GREEN BUILDING
In addition to the risks inherent in any mortgage transaction, the
unique characteristics of green buildings pose additional risks to lenders.
These differences may cause an underwriter to make an adverse recommen-
dation or require the lender to seek unnecessary or inappropriate solutions
solely due to lack of understanding of the characteristics associated with an
environmentally friendly building. Some of these risks occur uniformly in
118. Id.
119. Id. During times of rapid inflation or when major competition in the lending mar-
ket occurs, the ratios tend to get adjusted below the 120% threshold. Id.
120. Id. at 445–47.
121. Id. Normally, a building’s BER falls below 100%; but depending on a particular
market, the lower limit will customarily occur around 85%. Id. at 446. In considering the
EBTCF, these expenditures tend to occur on a more discretionary basis and may not have
relevance because financing is frequently available. Id. In situations where the property is
subject to a long-term lease or is in need of improvement, the underwriters may emphasize
this metric. Id.
122. Id.
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both newly constructed buildings and existing structures. However, for the
permanent lender, the incorporation of green design features into develop-
ment projects poses several risks beyond those of an existing structure. Ac-
cordingly, this Part addresses the risks common to all green building
mortgages and those specific to the construction context.
A. All Types of Buildings/Projects
Some of the risks specific to green buildings occur uniformly, no matter
the method of acquisition, and require consideration in every mortgage
transaction. First, the underwriting process must address issues specific to
green buildings in the financial ratios and models. Second, lenders must
require borrowers to purchase adequate property insurance to protect
against a loss at the collateralized structure. Finally, some of the features
that comprise a green building must undergo additional investigation where
the high-performance and cutting-edge nature of the completed structure
may jeopardize a borrower’s ability to repay its obligation.
1. Financial Issues
At the heart of the underwriting process, the financial models and in-
surability of a collateralized property can make or break a decision to fund a
loan application. The financial models play a significant role in determining
whether the borrower can afford to repay the loan and whether the collater-
alized property maintains any value at all. Likewise, the requirement that
the borrower maintain a suitable property insurance policy ensures that the
collateralized property retains sufficient value, such that the lender has ap-
propriate sources to recapture any loan balance in the event of a default.
Since the financial models and ratios weigh so heavily on whether to fund a
loan, the possibility that the underwriters’ analysis goes astray presents a
very real and credible obstacle that requires consideration.
a. Underwriting Models
Because underwriters place so much emphasis on financial models and
ratios in determining whether to recommend participation, the underlying
assumptions and calculations in these tools merit special consideration.
As previously discussed, a building’s appraised value is an integral com-
ponent of the underwriting process. As part of their financial analysis, un-
derwriters must obtain an appraisal for the building based on its current or
expected value, depending on the type of acquisition.123 In relying on the
appraisal for calculations such as the LTV, underwriters must recognize that
123. See Livingston, supra note 86, at 801–02.
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appraisers face many difficulties in setting a valuation on a green build-
ing.124 One practitioner explained, “there is currently a lack of comprehen-
sive educational material and practical guidance on the integration of
sustainability aspects into the educational programs for North American ap-
praisers.”125 Furthermore, appraisers often lack the hard data—regarding
comparable sales, absorption trends, rental rates, tenant retention, and oper-
ating or maintenance expenses—to assess the impact of green and high per-
formance characteristics on asset value.126 As a result, the financial ratios
that rely on the appraisal will probably contain significant margins of error
and, by implication, allow a larger tolerance for variation because the ap-
praisers lack a common approach to calculate a fair and accurate value for
sustainability features.
Moreover, the underwriter’s financial models must account for a myriad
of other assumptions unique to a green building’s price and associated reve-
nue. For example, many studies have identified price premiums associated
with certified green buildings.127 A later comprehensive evaluation of these
studies found that buildings possessing green certifications attained notice-
ably higher rates of occupancy and leases, as well as superior sales prices.128
Consequently, a loan applicant’s higher occupancy and lease rates may seem
overly optimistic to a cautious underwriter when in reality the projections
fall right on the mark, or offer a slightly conservative point of view.
Similarly, many of the financial incentives to construct green buildings
pose their own pitfalls to the underwriter’s models given their variability
across jurisdictions. These financial incentives often include property tax
124. Timothy P. Runde & Stacey Thoyre, Integrating Sustainability and Green Building
into the Appraisal Process, 2 J. SUSTAINABLE REAL EST. 221, 222 (2010).
125. Grant W. Austin, Sustainability and Income-Producing Property Valuation: North
American Status and Recommended Procedures, 4 J. SUSTAINABLE REAL EST. 78, 79 (2012).
126. See Jennifer Pitts & Thomas O. Jackson, Green Buildings: Valuation Issues and Per-
spectives, APPRAISAL J., Spring 2008, at 116, http://www.real-analytics.com/
Green%20Buildings.pdf; INST. FOR MKT. TRANSFORMATION & APPRAISAL INST., GREEN BUILDING
AND PROPERTY VALUE: A PRIMER FOR BUILDING OWNERS AND DEVELOPERS (2013), http://
www.imt.org/uploads/resources/files/Green_Building_and_Property_Value.pdf.
127. See e.g., Piet Eichholtz et al., Doing Well by Doing Good? Green Office Buildings, 100
AM . ECON. REV. 2494 (2010) [hereinafter Eichholtz et al., Doing Well]; Piet Eichholtz et al.,
The Economics of Green Building, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 50 (2013) [hereinafter Eichholtz et al.,
The Economics of Green Building]; Franz Fuerst & Patrick M. McAllister, Green Noise or Green
Value? Measuring the Effects of Environmental Certification on Office Values, 39 REAL EST. ECON.
45 (2011); Norman Miller et al., Does Green Pay Off?, 4 J. REAL EST. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 52
(2008); Jonathan Wiley et al., Green Design and the Market for Commercial Office Space, 41 J.
REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 228 (2010).
128. David Blumberg, LEED in the U.S. Commercial Office Market: Market Effects and the
Emergence of LEED for Existing Buildings, 4 J. SUSTAINABLE REAL EST. 24, 32 (2012).
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abatements or permission to transfer the tax credits to third parties.129 The
disparities in approaches taken by different jurisdictions offering such in-
ducements may provide a materially significant variation that requires spe-
cial attention in the underwriting process.
On the other hand, an underwriter must also proceed cautiously with
some of the green assertions made by borrowers for increased rents and
possibly inflated prices. In some instances, for example, a borrower may try
to justify pricing premiums for a green building due to the health and pro-
ductivity savings of the buyer or tenant, benefits that may not command
rent premiums in all markets.130
Consequently, the financial models and pro-forma statements used to
evaluate an applicant seeking to purchase a green building must navigate
these thorny issues with due care to serve as an accurate tool in assessing
the risk and exposure for the loan under consideration.
b. Property Insurance
When addressing the insurability of a green building and protecting
against a loss due to the destruction of the potential collateral, the under-
writer must begin by developing an understanding of the regulatory obliga-
tions specific to that property. In some jurisdictions, the state and local
governments have adopted green construction standards, which incorporate
the unique features of these high-performance structures into the building
code.131 For example, the International Code Council established the Inter-
national Green Construction Code (IgCC) for adoption by governments
looking to add a sustainability component to their existing building codes132
129. See Prum, State Incentives, supra note 7, at 188–98; Prum, Aalberts & Del Percio,
supra note 1, at 212. The type of incentive, as well as the means for claiming it from a state or
local government, occurs in varying methods. See Prum, State Incentives, supra note 7, at
188–98; Prum, Aalberts & Del Percio, supra note 1, at 208–13. Many states provide tax
credits to the developer of a green building. See Prum, State Incentives, supra note 7, at
188–98; Prum, Aalberts & Del Percio, supra note 1, at 208–13. However, some jurisdictions
that do not have a state income tax, like Nevada, offer sales and property tax abatements. See
Prum, State Incentives, supra note 7; Prum, Aalberts & Del Percio, supra note 1, at 212. Ore-
gon allows the “pass-through-option,” whereby the developer may transfer the credit to a
qualified third party in return for a cash payment equivalent to the net present value of the
tax credit. OR. ADMIN. R. 330-090-0110(48)–(49) (2015).
130. See generally Prum & Del Percio, supra note 94, at 248.
131. See Prum, Next Green Issue, supra note 12, at 441–50.
132. Int’l Code Council, IgCC Code Development, HISTORY OF THE IGCC, http://
www.iccsafe.org/history-of-the-igcc/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). Established as a nonprofit
organization in 1994, the ICC develops and offers a single set of comprehensive and coordi-
nated model national building codes for adoption by communities and governments. Int’l
Code Council, Overview, ABOUT THE ICC, http://www.iccsafe.org/AboutICC/Pages/de-
fault.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
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and the State of California has developed and implemented its own green
building code, CALGreen.133
In these situations, the current insurance requirements should not ma-
terially change. An underwriter must still ensure that the owner of the col-
lateralized building chooses suitable coverage from a reputable carrier that
also protects the lender’s interest. The standard requirements would include
a rider for “ordinance or law” coverage,134 since many cause-of-loss forms
exclude costs associated with changes in building codes or regulations.135
Green building codes are generally subject to periodic updates that
ratchet up the environmental standards for all new or modified structures.
These building code updates are eventually incorporated into current ordi-
nances or regulations and therefore require that the typical commercial in-
surance policy adjust correspondingly to provide coverage.136 Accordingly,
the lender will face no new risk in these jurisdictions, and the underwriter
must adjust its current practices.
In other jurisdictions, green construction standards are not mandates
under the applicable building code but rather are voluntary or induced
through incentives.137 These jurisdictions normally set a standard for com-
pliance and then offer some type of perceived benefit to the private devel-
oper for furthering the established green building goals.138 Most
government programs require a third-party organization’s certification to
receive the proffered benefit.139 In other localities, a developer need only
demonstrate intent to obtain the third-party certification, but not necessarily
complete USGBC’s LEED obligations specifically, to receive the
incentive.140
As a result, an underwriter must pay special attention to any sustainable
features or certifications attained by the building, the coverage associated
133. CAL. BLDG. STANDARD CO M M’N, CALGREEN: THE 2010 CALIFORNIA GREEN BUILDINGS
STANDARD CODE, ARE YOU READY? (2011), http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/bsc/CALGreen/
The-CALGreen-Story.pdf.
134. See Prum, Next Green Issue, supra note 12, at 455.
135. JAMES S. TRIESCHMANN ET AL., COMMERCIAL PROPERTY INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGE-
MENT 190 (4th ed. 1994).
136. See Prum, Next Green Issue, supra note 12, at 450.
137. Id. at 442.
138. See Prum, State Incentives, supra note 7, at 177–99; Prum, Aalberts & Del Percio,
supra note 1, at 208–19; A. Paige Reber, Note, Taking the “LEED”: Determining the Appropriate
Amount of Government Regulation in Projects, 98 KY. L.J. 573, 577–80 (2009–2010).
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., Prum, Aalberts & Del Percio, supra note 1, at 209–19 (highlighting that
some states allow tax incentives for compliance with green building standards from a differ-
ent third party’s program, not just USGBC’s LEED certification program); Prum, State
Incentives, supra note 7, at 189–99 (detailing individual state programs, some of which accept
certification from an alternate program to LEED).
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with any proposed property insurance policy, and any applicable laws or
ordinances. The certifications vary between the private third-party verifica-
tion organizations and each system maintains different levels with distinct
standards.141 In addition, third-party verification organizations routinely
update their programs to reflect advances in building technology.142 This
means that in the event of a loss, the reconstructed collateralized building
may not maintain the same attributes, like a LEED or Green Globes certifi-
cation, bestowed on the prior structure. The reconstructed collateralized
building therefore may see a significant decrease in value due to a preceding
upgrade by the third-party verifier that the insurer does not feel obligated
to attain.
Moreover, property insurers offer different products with varying de-
grees of coverage that usually exclude costs associated with changes in
building codes or regulations.143 Coupled with the previously explained dif-
ficulties in trying to assign an accurate value to a green building and its
sustainability features,144 these meaningful differences create many uncer-
tainties in coverage that must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.145
To remedy the concerns of policyholders and to offer additional fea-
tures, several insurers offer supplemental endorsements specifically targeted
to provide more complete coverage for green buildings.146 While each of the
supplemental endorsements is dependent on the underlying language con-
141. See Prum, Greenbacks, supra note 13, at 446–47; Prum, Aalberts & Del Percio, supra
note 1, at 194–99.
142. See Prum, Greenbacks, supra note 13, at 446–47.
143. See id. at 444–47. Today’s commercial property insurance policies usually identify a
method for valuing the building to determine the amount of loss should a claim occur. See
TRIESCHMANN ET AL., supra note 135. Typical options that an insured may elect to follow in-
clude the actual cash value method, the replacement cost approach, or the functional build-
ing. Id. at 146. The actual cash value method determines the insurer’s obligation by
subtracting the depreciated use from the current cost of reconstructing the original structure,
whereas the replacement cost approach covers the property without the reduction for depre-
ciation. Id. In contrast, the functional building valuation approach allows the insurer to re-
pair or replace the building with one that performs just like the insured property, but may
cost less to construct. Id. at 150. These valuation methods offer meaningful differences in an
insurer’s obligations and could affect what and how a borrower receives as compensation in
the event of a loss to the collateralized building, especially if the structure includes high
performance features. See Prum, Greenbacks, supra note 13, at 451–58.
144. See supra Subsection II.A.1.a.
145. See Prum, Greenbacks, supra note 13, at 451–58.
146. See e.g., INS. SERV. OFFICE, INC., POLICY NO. CP 04 02 09 09, INCREASED COST OF LOSS
AND RELATED EXPENSES FOR GREEN UPGRADES (2009) (on file with author); FIREMAN’S FUND INS.
CO., PROPERTY-GARD GREEN COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT (2010) (on file with author); THE TRAV-
ELERS CO. INC., GREEN BLDG. COVERAGE ENHANCEMENT ENDORSEMENT (2008) (on file with au-
thor); LEXINGTON INS. CO., UPGRADE TO GREEN – COMMERCIAL ENDORSEMENT (2008) (on file
with author); LIBERTY MUTUAL GROUP OF COS., GREEN SELECT (2008) (on file with author).
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tained in the property policy,147 these insurance industry products appear to
offer a one-size-fits-all solution to the risks posed by a green building loss.
However, many times a properly valued replacement cost policy, along with
an endorsement to cover changes in building codes or regulations, will
suffice.148
Hence, the complexities of the regulatory framework by state and local
governments create a patchwork of legislative approaches that translates
into a complicated evaluation for an underwriter to determine if the collat-
eralized property maintains sufficient insurance coverage to protect the
lender’s interest. Thus, when making a recommendation on whether to fund
a loan on a green building, underwriters must recognize that the financial
models and requirements applicable to traditional buildings need modifica-
tion to avoid false indicators of risk or situations of contentment when a
hazard is actually present.
2. Green Attributes
In addition to the financial issues, many of the key features that make a
building environmentally friendly149 may also offer a reason for potential
concern.
First, the emerging products or techniques employed in green buildings
may create risks themselves. Green buildings are often designed as part of a
“holistic” approach that pairs common sense solutions, such as optimal siting
and use of local resources, with cutting edge technology to produce a high
performance building.150 This combination of innovative design, along with
emerging products, creates risks that may diminish the value of the collater-
alized building or require significant renovations after occupancy and jeop-
ardize a borrower’s ability to repay. For instance, some of the requirements
associated with a third-party certification may pose significant risks of cre-
ating moisture and mold problems in a building.151 These may occur due to
attempts to reduce energy consumption, diminish a building’s heat island
147. See Prum, Greenbacks, supra note 13, at 451.
148. Id. at 459.
149. See generally Darren A. Prum, Green Buildings, High Performance Buildings, and Sus-
tainable Construction: Does It Really Matter What We Call Them?, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2010).
150. Id. at 5–7.
151. See generally J. David Odom et al., The Hidden Risks of Green Buildings: Avoiding
Moisture & Mold Problems, 2009 NCARB MONOGRAPH SERIES 2. Many commercial property
insurance policies now contain exclusions for moisture and mold problems because the risk of
loss is so great. See Prum, Next Green Issue, supra note 12, at 448. The insurance industry
takes a varied approach through its coverage definitions and exclusions, but many carriers
appear willing to accept these risks when an insured purchases the green building endorse-
ment in conjunction with an underlying property policy. See id. at 452–53.
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effect, reuse or cutback construction waste, improve indoor air quality, or
offer an innovative design or product.152
A typical tradeoff occurs when balancing energy performance and mois-
ture controls.153 When a designer or builder decides to increase the thermal
insulation within a wall system, she may inadvertently change the dew point
locations along with the places where condensation will occur around the
structure.154 In addition, any decision that alters the designs associated with
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning controls will impact the proper
times for operation and may affect any strategies for handling moisture
within the structure.155
Similarly, installing a vegetated roof can create moisture and mold is-
sues stemming from the development of condensation under the roofing
membrane and other types of water intrusion.156 Additionally, a poorly de-
signed system could allow mold spores to penetrate a building from an air
intake for the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system near a vege-
tated roof.157
Furthermore, many of the third-party certification programs promote
the reduction of construction management waste through the reuse of
materials, which may allow undetectable mold-contaminated materials to
find their way into new structures.158 When they do, mold issues can be-
come pervasive because the contamination does not usually become visible
to the inhabited side of the structure along with the inability for air testing
to identify its presence.159
Finally, the implementation of new products or designs that have not
demonstrated their durability and reliability over the years poses an in-
creased risk.160 Forensic building specialists J. David Odom and Richard
Scott explain, “the history of building failures indicates that when new
products are used, or traditional construction processes are significantly al-
tered, the performance of buildings is often adversely affected. Sometimes
152. See Odom et al., supra note 151, at 4–5.




157. Michael J. Bauer, Potential Legal Implications of “Green” Roofs, 2011-01 CONSTRUCTION
BRIEFINGS 1, 8.
158. See e.g., U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED V4 FOR BUILDING DESIGN AND CONSTRUC-
TION 95–96 (2015); GREEN BLDG. INITIATIVE, GREEN GLOBES FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION: TECHNICAL
REFERENCE MANUAL 138–41 (2014).
159. See Odom et al., supra note 151, at 4–5.
160. J. David Odom & Richard Scott, The Risks of Building Green in the Southeast, SE.
CONSTRUCTION, Feb. 2008, at 37, http://www.epicstructures.net/administrator/imagebuilding/
lbfg/articles/completed/The-Risks-of-Building-Green-in-the-Southeast.pdf.
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these changes in building performance result in dramatic failures, especially
in hot, humid climates.”161 Consequently, the incentives to implement new
products or designs to gain a third-party certification, accompanied by its
increased amount of documentation, offers the opportunity for more claims
in litigation along with the possibility that the borrower may not maintain
sufficient resources to repair or salvage a structure suffering from “sick
building syndrome.”162
While a traditional building may develop some of these same issues, the
desire to attain a third-party certification may exacerbate many similar areas
of concern, such as moisture and mold problems. Therefore, underwriters
must evaluate a building’s unique characteristics and give consideration to
the unintended consequences that environmentally friendly features can
have on a structure. Under extreme circumstances, these unanticipated
problems may prompt the borrower to walk away from the collateralized
property and leave the lender in a situation that requires investment beyond
the loan principle to terminate its involvement.
B. Development Projects
For the permanent lender, the incorporation of green design features
into a development project poses several risks beyond those of a traditional
structure. As previously discussed, the issues surrounding the satisfaction of
161. Id.
162. T. Sky Woodward & Erin C. Miller, New Risks for Manufacturers Take Root, FOR THE
DEFENSE, Dec. 2009, at 44, 46, http://www.wcsr.com/resources/pdfs/prodarticle121009.pdf.
In two distinct landmark cases involving mold, the courthouses in Polk and Martin Counties
in Florida experienced “sick building syndrome,” which cost both governments significant
amounts of money to remedy, along with litigation against those designing and constructing
structures and their insurers for the problems they caused. Scott Wyman, Courthouse Mold
Fight Has Played Out Before in Florida, SUNSENTINEL (Apr. 1, 2009), http://articles.sun-senti-
nel.com/2009-04-01/news/0904010171_1_courthouse-sick-building-mold. Polk County paid
$37 million in 1987 to construct a new courthouse, but the government spent another $50
million to repair the building after 600 employees were evacuated five years after commis-
sioning due to mold. Id. Some people described the situation as “a courthouse of horrors” and
“a ten story, 500,000 square foot petri dish.” Robert E. Geisler, The Fungusamongus: Sick
Building Survival Guide, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 511, 512 (1996).
Across the state, Martin County in Florida also constructed a courthouse and adjoining
office complex for $11 million. Geisler, supra, at 512. Eventually, the county evacuated and
virtually rebuilt the courthouse after complaints by employees and visitors. Cliff Hutchinson
& Robert Powell, A New Plague – Mold Litigation: How Junk Science and Hysteria Built an
Industry, in U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM & THE MANHATTAN INST., THE GROWING
HAZARD OF MOLD LITIGATION 1, 15 (2003). The county pursued an action in court against the
contractor and its insurers and won a verdict of $14.2 million, which was later affirmed on
appeal. See Centex-Rooney Constr. Co. v. Martin County, 706 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
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local ordinances and zoning requirements, the receipt of a permanent certif-
icate of occupancy from the appropriate authorities, and the qualification
for any financial incentives, such as property tax abatements, remain at the
forefront of risk.163
In situations where a government adopts sustainability components into
its existing building code, the risk remains the same in green buildings. In
fact, a lender is somewhat protected under this scenario because the perma-
nent financing obligations are often contingent on the issuance of a certifi-
cate of occupancy, which is itself contingent on compliance with the
building code of the jurisdiction.164 Nonetheless, Peter Britell, in his trea-
tise on green building law, points out that specific green issues may develop
into a risk for the lender in situations where the permanent funding already
occurred but loose ends on the construction side still remain.165 This might
include situations where a government agency adds unforeseen new require-
ments, such as a physical inspection or other compliance measures.166
Moreover, a failure to qualify for any of the expected financial incen-
tives may create some risk within this scenario. Without the financial incen-
tives, the collateralized property may see a reduction in its value.167 Absent
a provision in the take-out agreement to the contrary, the lender may be
required to purchase the promissory note used to finance the construction
of the building and assume a position where the loan principle may exceed
the collateralized property’s value.
Structures seeking third-party certification pose the same risk, originat-
ing in a different manner. The building certification process generally oc-
curs months after construction is completed and the triggering event calls
for the permanent loan to be funded by the lender.168 Should the building
fail to receive recognition by a third-party certification organization, the
lender will have few credible options for a resolution. If the lender has
funded the permanent loan, it faces the risk that the collateralized property
will not attain the increased valuation that predicated the underwriting of
the loan. This outcome may also create a situation where the loan’s principle
exceeds the collateralized property’s value and places the lender in a posi-
tion for a potential loss almost immediately.
Because this type of predicament appears to be a likely scenario, the
lender must weigh its credible options should the building fail to obtain the
desired third-party certifications. A more proactive position in the take-out
163. See supra text accompanying notes 92–101.
164. See BRITELL, supra note 9, § 8.02[1]. R
165. Id. § 8.02[1][b].
166. Id.
167. See id. § 8.02[1].
168. Id.
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agreement, along with the possibility of other remedies that do not invite
additional liabilities, offers a pathway to mitigating a possible loss scenario.
C. Existing Buildings
Given that many of the issues associated with developing a property
will have already been resolved, there are very few differences between
traditional and green building loans for an existing structure that have not
been previously discussed.
Risks that may occur in a newly developed structure, such as the receipt
of a third-party certification, can become a part of the documentation re-
quirements handled in the typical underwriting process.169 Moreover, some
of the other valuation issues may also be resolved due to the existence of the
building. The valuation associated with an existing building could be less
contestable, given that it will likely have a market history and comparable
properties in the surrounding neighborhoods. This will provide less varia-
tion and subjectivity in the appraisal.
In addition, the financial models compiled by the underwriters will be
able to utilize historical data for the green building. An existing green
building will maintain detailed records for any revenue it generates and its
operating expenses. The building’s seller should also maintain specifics on
any tenants and the remaining time associated with their lease agreements.
This additional data specific to the proposed collateralized building will
limit the subjective judgments by underwriters and create a more precise
model for the underwriting decision that takes into account the market
value for the structure’s environmentally friendly features.
III. PROPOSAL FOR MANAGING RISK ON A
GREEN BUILDING MORTGAGE
As a consequence of this diverse set of exposures a lender faces in pro-
viding permanent financing to an environmentally friendly building, the
decision to fund or turn down the borrower’s application requires knowl-
edge of the unique traits linked to these structures, a careful evaluation of
the property to be collateralized, and an understanding of the real estate
market. This knowledge will translate into more prudent decisionmaking at
all levels, greater access to capital for green building projects, and a demon-
stration of commitment to public policies that favor a more green built
environment.
When selecting underwriting criteria, lenders must navigate the ardu-
ous process of avoiding applicants with a high risk of default, without un-
169. Id. § 8.02[2].
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necessarily rejecting strong candidates. Borrowers must recognize that the
unique characteristics of a green building create difficulties for the perma-
nent financers and that the underwriting process that may lead to flawed
decisionmaking. In responding to the additional risk exposure, lenders to-
day may turn to traditional approaches that attach a higher rate of interest
to the loans on a green building or choose to pass on the application all
together.
This Part proposes solutions for better managing loss exposures while
providing permanent financing for green buildings. These measures may be
integrated into existing underwriting processes or incorporated into the
loan covenants. Based on these proposed actions, a lender can better manage
the added risk created by a green building mortgage while eliminating barri-
ers for the green building community.
A. Underwriting Process-Driven Adjustments
Bearing in mind the previously discussed issues that arise out of the
underwriting process,170 along with the unique challenges introduced by a
green building,171 lenders must consider altering such practices. A simple
solution could include the creation of a distinct process for those applica-
tions that fit into the green building category. A lender’s application could
require a prospective borrower to make a distinction as to whether the pro-
posed collateralized building fits within traditional or green building stan-
dards when the funding of the loan occurs. By requiring such a distinction
in the borrower’s application, the underwriting process could proceed in a
way that properly evaluates the unique risks associated with funding a loan
for a green building.
1. Supplemental Application for Green Buildings
When developing a distinct process for determining the lending expo-
sure on a green building, underwriters should design a supplemental appli-
cation that requests information, documentation, and answers related to the
sustainable features of the structure, over and above those normally re-
quested, to help address the quantification and other issues discussed in
Part II. This supplemental application should request documentation per-
taining to third-party certifications received, acknowledgments of compli-
ance with government regulations or private obligations relating to
environmental construction standards, and tax certificates or similar finan-
cial benefits conveyed upon the completed structure.
170. See discussion supra Section I.B.
171. See discussion supra Part II.
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In the event that the loan is part of the take-out agreement from the
short-term financing, then the supplemental application should modify the
document request to include the name of the third-party organization sup-
plying certification, the version pertaining to the proposed building, and the
expected level upon completion.172 It should also seek information from the
applicant with respect to applicable government zoning or ordinances, along
with any restrictive covenants placed on the land that may affect the status
of a completed structure.
With the requirement that a loan application supply this information
alongside the regular submission for either an existing building or one
under construction, underwriters can feel assured that they received appro-
priate guidance from the applicant and direct their attention to the evalua-
tion and data research aspects of the assessment, which entail the
completion of the financial models and pro-forma statements.
2. Gathering and Analyzing Green Building Data
When conducting their evaluations, underwriters must address data ac-
curacy issues. Specialized consultants and expert research provide a good
solution. As the appraisal community continues to refine its approach to
quantifying sustainable property features, underwriters must find those
professionals with substantial experience assessing green buildings to obtain
better evaluations. This would ensure that financial models and pro-forma
statements present the most accurate data available and enhance confidence
in the captured and quantified data, along with any anticipated governmen-
tal assistance received in the building’s construction.
In conjunction with the use of experienced professionals, cutting edge
research in this emerging field can help determine market premiums and
liabilities more accurately. Researchers from around the world continue to
evaluate and assess how the various markets are reacting to green buildings
and develop explanations and models for predicting outcomes to the same
172. Several organizations provide identifiable systems that endeavor to measure and
substantiate the sustainable features within a building. See Prum, Aalberts & Del Percio,
supra note 1, at 194–200. The Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)
program was created by the United States Green Building Council (USGBC) in 1998. Id. at
195. LEED provides an array of approaches for compliance depending on the construction
type, as well as 4 different levels of certification: LEED Certified, LEED Silver, LEED
Gold, and LEED Platinum. U.S. Green Bldg. Council, Rating Systems, LEED, http://
www.usgbc.org/leed#rating (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). Likewise, the Green Building Initia-
tive operates the Green Globes Program and awards one to four “Green Globes” based on a
project’s level of achievement. Green Bldg. Initiative, Overview, GREEN GLOBES CERTIFICATION,
http://www.thegbi.org/green-globes/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
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questions asked by the underwriters.173 For example, several published stud-
ies consider the income part of the financial statements and evaluate the
occupancy rates and premiums for leases and sales of green buildings;174
others analyze the cost side through utility usage and other operating
costs.175 The applied aspects of this research could provide an underwriter
useful insight through formulas, models, and multipliers that reinforce and
validate the process used to determine exposure for a given application,
based on the collected market data for the location of the green building.
Accordingly, a modified underwriting process that takes advantage of
experienced professionals, along with cutting edge research in the field
through a specialized evaluation of the proposed loan for a structure with
sustainable characteristics, will allow underwriters and lenders to develop
more reliable and accurate financial models and pro-forma statements to
make better decisions on whether to fund an application for long-term fi-
nancing on a green building.
B. Document-Driven Adjustments
Lenders can also protect against much of their exposure through the
loan documents. Lenders must develop a cohesive set of documents that
incorporates specific provisions as conditions precedent to funding, along
with those that address post-closing situations. Through pre- and post-clos-
ing conditions, lenders can make allowances for the exposures that are not
present in a traditional building.
1. Pre-Closing Conditions
Given that the lender maintains a superior position to the borrower and
possibly the short-term financer prior to funding the mortgage, inserting
conditions precedent is one of the most useful tools to minimize exposure
before disbursing the loan funds. Because these contingencies can be used
to deny funding at a later point in time, the lender of the long-term financ-
ing must consider the unique exposures of the green building and the meth-
ods of acquisition to strategically address the different risks.
173. See e.g., Eichholtz et al., Doing Well, supra note 127; Eichholtz et al., The Economics
of Green Building, supra note 127; Fuerst & McAllister 1, supra note 127; Miller et al., supra
note 127; Norman G. Miller, Dave Pogue, Jeryldine Saville & Charles Tu, The Operations and
Management of Green Buildings in the United States, 2 J. SUSTAINABLE REAL EST. 51 (2010); Wiley,
supra note 127.
174. See e.g., Eichholtz et al., Doing Well, supra note 127; Eichholtz et al., The Economics
of Green Building, supra note 127; Fuerst & McAllister, supra note 127; Miller et al., supra note
127; Wiley, supra note 127.
175. E.g., Miller, Pogue, Saville & Tu, supra note 173.
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a. Development Projects
When lenders decide to provide long-term financing through a take-out
agreement as part of the construction loan, the pre-closing conditions must
consider and attempt to mitigate some of the unique risks previously dis-
cussed.176 The long-term lender must address situations that trigger the
purchase of the construction loan but where the building has yet to receive
its final green certifications. The simple solution is to include language in
the take-out agreement that does not obligate the long-term lender to fund
its loan until issuance of the final green certifications. Often, this is not
possible or becomes impracticable.177
To remedy this major issue, Peter Brittell, in his treatise on green build-
ing law, recommends that the long-term lender require the developer and
those providing the short-term financing to hire an independent consultant
to provide assurances at each stage of construction with regard to the third-
party certification goal with an incremental approach that includes language
at the development’s initial, middle, and final stages.178 He also suggests a
condition that requires the borrower to prepare, complete, and file all of the
necessary documents towards attaining recognition with a third-party certi-
fication organization in conjunction with approval from an external consult-
ant prior to the first draw on the construction loan.179
Next, Britell addresses the building’s ongoing construction by condi-
tioning any subsequent draws on the construction loan.180 He offers lan-
guage that requires the consultant to review any and all approved change
orders with all of the bulletins and other documents issued by the architect
of record to determine and certify that none of these situations will reduce
or prevent the building from attaining the desired third-party certifica-
tion.181 Finally, Brittell proposes a condition that occurs prior to the final
draw on the construction loan and the issuance of a certificate of occupancy
for the building.182 He puts forward language that would require the bor-
rower to supply: (1) a temporary certificate of occupancy for the structure;
(2) a copy of the actual submission for final certification to the desired
third-party verification organization; (3) an attestation from the borrower
that the enhanced commissioning of the building is underway pursuant to
the third-party verification organization’s initial response to the original
176. See supra Section II.B.
177. Id.
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submission for certification; and (4) a confirmation from the green building
consultant that the submission sent to the third-party verification organiza-
tion was examined and that the consultant maintains the opinion that noth-
ing material will affect the structure’s ability to attain certification.183
Taking a different approach, long-term lenders could also look at mech-
anisms to transfer the risk that the building fails to gain the desired third-
party certification. Since the exposure may originate from different sources,
such as defective workmanship, improperly substituted products, poor de-
sign, or a mistake in the documentation, a lender would need to consider a
combination of insurance products to transfer the risk.
In attempting to mitigate these risks, lenders could include covenants in
the take-out and loan agreements that require a performance bond on the
building’s construction and a covenant that the surety must extend coverage
to include the attainment of the desired third-party certification.184 This
type of requirement would provide additional financial means for issues
that may originate from a physical problem in the building along with those
concerning documentation. By relying on a performance bond, the lender
could reduce its exposure to the possibility that the building fails to attain
the desired third-party certification and transfer some of the risk to a surety
with large resources to cure any deficiencies.185
Similarly, lenders could try to mitigate some of the design risks by
requiring borrowers to submit evidence of insurance coverage for their de-
sign teams and policy limits for prior approval as a condition for agreeing to
participate in the building’s development. This type of requirement allows
lenders to ensure that coverage exists for all designers, that the carrier
maintains satisfactory resources to pay for any errors or omissions on their
part, and that sufficient policy limits exist to cover any losses that might
occur from failing to attain the promised third-party certification.186
183. Id.
184. Currently, there is no clear industry standard as to whether a performance bond
will cover completion all the way to attaining the desired third-party certification, or just the
building by itself. See Prum & Medders, supra note 11, at 25–37. The coverage issue remains
within the performance specification of the construction project and the language used in the
contract that forms the bond. Id.
185. Id. at 25.
186. See generally Prum & Del Percio, supra note 94, at 257–59. Beyond reviewing the
policy itself, a lender might consider taking a look at any agreements between the borrower
and the design professionals to make sure that any contracts call for the appropriate standard
of care. See Darren A. Prum, Green Building Liability: Considering the Applicable Standard of
Care and Strategies for Establishing a Different Level by Agreement, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 33, 59
(2012). Because participants in a green building will most likely avoid the professional stan-
dard, a prudent lender must investigate further to ensure that those responsible did not
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These different solutions offer several credible options to lenders that
genuinely aim to mitigate the unique risks posed by green buildings prior to
a loan’s funding.
b. Existing Buildings
As previously discussed, the exposure to a lender for providing a loan
on an existing green building offers few differences from that of a tradi-
tional structure.187 However, underwriters must still confirm that the bor-
rower’s assertions regarding the green building features are true.
Consequently, underwriters must request supporting documentation that
the building received certification from a third-party verification organiza-
tion and that any tax certificates or similar instruments, which convey spe-
cial financial benefits upon the completed structure occurred.
To eliminate the possibility of risk occurring from an untruthful appli-
cant, one commentator suggests two different closing conditions that the
borrower must fulfill prior to funding the loan, beyond the normal require-
ments for items such as certificates of occupancy.188 He proposes that lend-
ers include a preceding condition that the borrower must deliver a copy of
the certification issued by the third-party verification organization as part of
its loan obligations.189 He also advises lenders to incorporate another pre-
ceding condition for the borrower to provide the supporting documentation
that may exist for property tax abatements or other incentives that convey
financial benefits upon the completed structure as well.190
Accordingly, a lender can feel confident that its approach to an existing
green building poses few differences from that of a traditional one, and that
with minimal effort and adjustments, the lender can make a good decision
on whether to approve an applicant’s loan.
2. Post-Closing Conditions
When considering the exposure a lender faces after funding the mort-
gage on a green building, the loan documents provide a good opportunity to
address issues that may affect the borrower’s decision to live up to its obli-
gations at a later point in time. In some instances, the post-closing condi-
tions actually take shape before the loan funds, but the actual performance
occurs afterwards. Other times, the conditions subsequent must provide the
contractually lower their standard below that of a reasonable person or did not bifurcate their
services to avoid it either. Id.
187. See supra Section II.C.
188. See BRITELL, supra note 9, § 8.02[2]. R
189. Id.
190. Id.
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lender a means of relief should the borrower fail to live up to his obliga-
tions. In drafting these conditions, lenders must keep an eye towards both
the present and future to protect their interest and prevent unpalatable con-
sequences should the borrower take actions that are contrary to the loan
covenants.
a. Property Insurance
While the need and process to obtain the appropriate type and level of
property insurance coverage might start prior to the funding of the perma-
nent financing, the actual requirement will most likely occur as part of a
condition subsequent. However, in the case of a green building, the under-
writers must take a more proactive approach to ensure that the policy pro-
vides adequate coverage for the myriad of features and regulatory
frameworks that apply to the structure and prevent the borrower from end-
ing up underwater due to an uncovered claim and loss. As such, the under-
writer should provide the applicant with an evaluation of the proposed
collateralized property’s insurance policy that addresses the areas of concern
and stipulates changes in coverage.
As a starting point, the underwriter must closely review and consider
the application of the ordinance or law exclusion, the valuation method and
amount, and the coverage features as applied to the green building. When
taking into account the ordinance or law exclusion, the underwriter must
consider the existing and prospective attitudes regarding green building fea-
tures in the jurisdiction where the property is located.
If a jurisdiction has already adopted a green building code like the
IgCC or CALGreen, then the lender must insist that the property owner
obtain a higher coverage in the ordinance or law exclusion because a future
increase in the standard is highly likely. Conversely, the ordinance or law
coverage may not pose as large a risk for normal structures in jurisdictions
that are unlikely to adopt a more environmentally friendly building code
because many of the green requirements already surpass baseline code
requirements.
In weighing the valuation issues, the underwriter must insist upon re-
placement-cost coverage because of the unique features associated with a
green building and its high performance characteristics. Although the pro-
cess for quantifying the value of intangible green building features is evolv-
ing, data collected in the underwriting process may make the attachment of
a value much smoother and deter an insurer from trying to avoid paying the
higher costs associated with replacement. Historical valuations and other
data from the insured and bank can negate the insurer’s undervaluation.
Additionally, because the insurer drives the process of constructing the re-
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placement structure, there is a risk that replacements will fail to maintain
the property’s green or high performance features. The underwriter must
therefore require that the property owner transfer the risk of a property
becoming less valuable than the loan balance.
Finally, lenders must instruct underwriters to pay special attention to
the policy coverages for the collateralized property. Given that many sys-
tems are designed to meet sustainable policy objectives and can be easily
replaced with more efficient models during a product’s evolutionary cycle,
other aspects of a green building may present difficulties. These types of
situations occur because many of the third-party verification programs in-
duce designers and developers to include unique architectural and other
types of features into the green building to gain additional credit towards a
specific certification. If the proposed collateralized building contains one of
these features, then the underwriter should create a list of coverage con-
cerns and require the borrower to obtain endorsements to make sure these
aspects receive inclusion in the policy, similar to the approach recom-
mended for vegetative roofs.
Moreover, underwriters should confirm that the underlying property
policy does not contain language that excludes the documentation associ-
ated with delivering and recertifying the building to a third-party verifica-
tion organization’s standards. In the event that the underlying policy fails to
exclude such a requirement, then the lender and property owner could insist
that the replacement coverage approach will include such documentation,
especially when the valuation reflects the significance of this certification
and may become a point of contention with an insurer.
Hence, lenders must instruct underwriters that the property insurance
requirement with a green building poses significant coverage gaps if the
loan is funded. Lenders must extensively review the borrower’s policy for
these types of issues and insist on endorsements with applicable coverage to
prevent a future loss.
b. Consequences and Remedies for Noncompliance
Loan documents should address the consequences of a borrower’s fail-
ure to comply with the terms of the contract. In the context of a green
building, for example, noncompliance may occur when the borrower fails to
achieve the green building certification or tax-abatement benefits in a
timely manner.
When anticipating non-compliance, lenders must consider the various
options they may take, such as foreclosure or self-help, which may be un-
palatable to the borrower. Following a traditional approach, the lender may
choose to foreclose upon the property for breach of contract and take over
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the collateralized building. While this may seem like a viable option, a fore-
closure action might be overly harsh for a perfectly functional building that
only failed to receive its green building certification or property tax abate-
ment.191 Furthermore, a lender will eschew remedying any deficiencies in
the collateralized property on its own unless absolutely necessary because of
the potential risk that a hostile court might attach additional liabilities due
to its participation in the construction project.192 As such, a lender must
consider inserting unpalatable conditions subsequent into the loan agree-
ment so that it may make a borrower think twice before going down the
path of noncompliance.
In these situations, the lender must prepare for issues that arise out of
documentation, corrective construction, or some type of incurable defect.193
Documentation issues, such as amended filings with the third-party verifi-
cation organization or updates to the drawings and specifications, can be
easily resolved.194
Similarly, a building might require corrective construction to attain the
third-party verification organization’s certification.195 This might include
removing and replacing noncompliant equipment, work, or finishes on the
building to meet the required standard.196 In both cases, Britell suggests
that lenders can insert post-closing conditions into lending agreements that
require borrowers to accept personal and financial responsibility to com-
plete all necessary tasks required to achieve the agreed upon certification.197
He proposes that the language make borrowers bear the costs for the neces-
sary green building, construction, and legal consultants.198
Alternatively, or in conjunction with Britell’s proposal, lenders could
insert post-closing conditions that require the borrower to provide tempo-
rary financial impounds at the time the long-term financing receives fund-
ing. Similar to the current practice that impounds interest or property
taxes, a lender could reserve the right to require the borrower to place suffi-
cient funds in an escrow account to cover any costs remaining with attaining
the third-party certification. Upon the receipt of certification, the borrower
191. See id. § 8.02[1]. In a variation of this situation that only concerns the green build-
ing aspects, the government may provide a Certificate of Occupancy, so the building is fully
functional.  It only fails to receive certification by a third party verification organization,
which may decrease its value and cause concern to the lender.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 95–96.
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would receive their funds back, but until that point, the funds would remain
as additional collateral to cover any extra cost necessary to achieve the
agreed upon certification.
Finally, the most difficult scenario is one in which neither documenta-
tion nor construction offers a solution to the building’s ills.199 This may
occur due to negligence of the designers or contractors to create a structure
that will qualify or a failure to execute the appropriate techniques, practices,
or procedures during construction.200
In those situations where the government compels a borrower to attain
certification from a third-party verification organization, a solution for the
building is unclear. But for the lack of certification, the structure would
most likely receive its certificate of occupancy and become an operational
building. Some jurisdictions impose fines and penalties for noncompliance
with green building requirements while others remain silent on the issue.201
Given the likelihood of this scenario becoming a reality, lenders should in-
sert language to cover this option too. Should the jurisdiction levy fines and
penalties for any noncompliance, the lender must include a provision that
makes the borrower responsible for such assessments, along with any costs
incurred to gain a certificate of occupancy.202 In jurisdictions that do not
address penalties for noncompliance, the language inserted by the lender
should place responsibility on the borrower to seek and pay for the costs
associated with gaining a variance from the appropriate authorities for the
building.203
Moreover, lenders should also add sufficient language to the loan docu-
ments to ensure that borrowers keep all responsible parties for delivering a
certified green building on task. Britell suggests a “default interest rate” that
terminates when the issue is cured as a means of dissuading borrowers from
heading in the wrong direction.204
Consequently, even where a completed building fails to receive certifi-
cation by a third-party verification organization, most, if not all, of the extra
exposure becomes manageable through better underwriting processes and
loan documents that anticipate potential quagmires.
199. Id.
200. For instance, an oversight might occur when the commissioning occurs improperly
or the contractors use an impermissible approach when handling the waste, disposal, or re-
cycling during building construction. See id.
201. See generally Prum, State Incentives, supra note 7; Prum, Aalberts & Del Percio, supra
note 1.
202. See BRITELL, supra note 9, § 8.02[2]. R
203. Id.
204. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Overall, lenders that provide long-term financing for green buildings
confront a great deal of exposure to loss from a variety of different sources.
Ordinary preventative measures, such as mortgage underwriting and insur-
ance, help mitigate certain risks: that the real property remains first in line
with respect to an action in foreclosure, that the lender does not turn into a
responsible party for an environmental cleanup, and that the collateralized
structure maintains or attains the necessary governmental approvals for oc-
cupancy. However, the addition of sustainable features to the structure
brings an extra layer of risk that many lenders will unknowingly reject or
accept due to a lack of knowledge on the subject matter, despite the real
exposures they present.
In making their decisions to provide funding for green buildings, lend-
ers that solely rely upon customary underwriting tools and analysis will face
a unique dilemma. Lenders must balance their tried-and-true business prac-
tices that fund loans for the most creditworthy of applicants with the desire
to support the overarching goals of policymakers to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions attributable to the built environment. Even though the twin aims
might seem mutually exclusive, lenders may align their practices with envi-
ronmental goals by understanding that the current practices for analyzing
and mitigating risk exposure from traditional structures will not adequately
address the unique issues presented by green buildings.
Therefore, prudent lenders must adjust their strategies for identifying,
explaining, and quantifying the exposures for these types of loans to better
support the agenda put forth by policymakers. After grasping the issues and
unique characteristics associated with green buildings, lenders can develop
practical and simple solutions to the risks posed by environmentally friendly
structures. These solutions include making adjustments and tweaking meth-
ods that evaluate and address the various exposures, while protecting the
lender’s interests.
Therefore, lenders can successfully and easily modify their procedures
and documentation when considering and funding a mortgage for a green
building so that they may demonstrate support for policymakers and their
ecological goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the built
environment.
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